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Abstract
We give polynomial time attacks on the McEliece public key cryptosystem based either
on algebraic geometry (AG) codes or on small codimensional subcodes of AG codes. These
attacks consist in the blind reconstruction either of an Error Correcting Pair (ECP), or an
Error Correcting Array (ECA) from the single data of an arbitrary generator matrix of a
code. An ECP provides a decoding algorithm that corrects up to d
∗
−1−g
2
errors, where d∗
denotes the designed distance and g denotes the genus of the corresponding curve, while
with an ECA the decoding algorithm corrects up to d
∗
−1
2
errors. Roughly speaking, for
a public code of length n over Fq, these attacks run in O(n4 log(n)) operations in Fq for
the reconstruction of an ECP and O(n5) operations for the reconstruction of an ECA. A
probabilistic shortcut allows to reduce the complexities respectively to O(n3+ε log(n)) and
O(n4+ε). Compared to the previous known attack due to Faure and Minder, our attack is
efficient on codes from curves of arbitrary genus. Furthermore, we investigate how far these
methods apply to subcodes of AG codes.
Introduction
Most of the commonly used public key cryptosystems are based only on two problems: the
hardness of factoring or the presumed intractability of the discrete logarithm problem. How-
ever, nothing ensures that the intractability of these problems will remain true for the foreseeable
future. In particular, we should notice that all these classical number theory problems would be
broken through P. Shor’s quantum factorization algorithm [40] in the case a quantum computer
would come to exist. Thus, the cryptographic community should look for alternative cryptosys-
tems namely Post-quantum cryptography. Code-based Cryptography, together with lattice-based
cryptography, multivariate cryptography and hash-based cryptography are the principal avail-
able techniques for Post-quantum cryptography (for instance see [2]).
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In the late seventies, McEliece [28] introduced the first code based public-key cryptosystem
whose security reposes on the hardness of decoding a random linear code. Compared to public-
key schemes based on integer factorization (like RSA) or discrete logarithm, McEliece not only
is resistant, so far, to attacks by quantum computers, but also presents faster encryption and
decryption schemes. However, due to the large size of the keys required to have a good security
level, it is rarely used in practice. Nevertheless, note that recent proposals based on quasi–cyclic
MDPC codes [30] allow compact keys of around 10000 bits for 128 bits of security, which makes
such proposal competitive with RSA.
The original proposal [28], which remains unbroken, was based on binary Goppa codes.
Later, several alternatives families with a higher correction capacity were proposed in order to
reduce the key size. For instance, Generalized Reed-Solomon codes [32], subcodes of them [1]
and Binary Reed-Muller codes [41], (note that this list is not exhaustive). All of these schemes
are subject to polynomial or sub-exponential time attacks [29, 42, 46].
Another attempt, suggested by Janwa and Moreno [17] was to use algebraic geometry (AG)
codes, their subfield subcodes or concatenated AG codes. Take notice that:
• The case of codes on curves of genus 0 was broken by Sidelnikov and Shestakov [42]. For
curves of genus 1 and 2 it was broken by Faure and Minder [13], but this attack has
several drawbacks which makes it impossible to generalize to higher genera. For instance,
the curve is required to be hyperelliptic, which is non generic for g > 2 and the attack
involves the computation of minimum-weight codewords whose cost is exponential in the
genus of the curve.
• In [39], Sendrier pointed out the inherent weakness of concatenated codes for public key
cryptography. Thus any proposal using concatenation should be avoided.
• In [27], the authors proved that the structure of the curve can be recovered from the only
knowledge of a generator matrix of the code. Unfortunately, the efficient construction of
a decoding algorithm from the obtained code’s representation is still lacking. Thus, this
result does not lead to an efficient attack.
In this article, we use another approach to attack the McEliece scheme based on AG codes.
Our attack is inspired by the attacks developed in [5, 6, 9, 10] called filtration attacks. Such
attack uses the fact that the computation of some Schur products permits to distinguish AG
codes from random ones. Moreover, this distinguisher can be used to compute an interesting
filtration of the code used as a public key. Compared to the previous filtration attacks which
allowed to recover completely the structure of the public key, the present attack is not actually a
key recovery attack. In particular, we do not compute the structure of the curve and the divisors
providing the public code and we show that such computations are not necessary. Indeed, it is
possible to stay in the realm of Fnq and its subspaces in order to compute all the necessary data
to get an efficient decoding algorithm for the AG code used as a public key. More precisely,
we show how to use filtration attack techniques in order to compute an error correcting pair
(see [33, 36]) allowing to correct up to d
∗−1−g
2 errors, where d
∗ denotes the designed distance.
These techniques can be pushed forward in order to compute an error correcting array [21] or
equivalently a well behaving sequence [16] allowing to correct up to d
∗−1
2 errors. The cost of this
reconstruction is in O(n4 log(n)) operations on the base field for the reconstruction of an error
correcting pair and O(n5) for the reconstruction of an error correcting array. A probabilistic
shortcut permits one to reduce these complexities to O(n3+ε) and O(n4+ε) respectively. Finally,
it is worth noting that many computations done in this filtration attack are very similar to
those presented in a very different context by Khuri–Makdisi in [19] in order to perform effective
computations on Jacobians of curves.
The attack presented in this article is proved to be efficient for almost any algebraic geometry
code. It should be emphasized that for some codes on curves of large genus g and whose length
satisfies 2g < n < 6g, the proofs of efficiency of the attack do not hold. Let us emphasize that
this does not mean that the attack will fail for such codes but only that we have no mathematical
proof for the efficiency of such cryptanalysis methods. On the other hand, we show that there
are several ways to extend the attack and we doubt that it would be possible to provide a large
family of codes for which our attack would be guaranteed to fail.
Outline of the article. Section 1 lists notation used in the article and introduces some
necessary material for the attack. Next, we deal with two operations on codes: the Schur
product introduced in Section 2 and a new operation which we have called the s-closure, defined
in Section 3. The first one will be essential to attack the McEliece scheme based on AG codes
while the second one will be crucial to attack McEliece scheme based on subcodes of AG codes.
Section 4 is devoted to the notion of error-correcting pairs (ECP) and error-correcting arrays
(ECA) which provide efficient decoding algorithms for AG codes. Section 5 provides a detailed
exposition of all the results needed for our attack. In particular we show how to compute an error
correcting pair or an error correcting array of a given code only by computing Schur products and
performing Gaussian elimination. Finally, Section 6 indicates how all the previous techniques
may be used to create an attack of the McEliece scheme based on AG codes and Section 7 deals
with the case of subcodes of AG codes.
Note. A part of the material of this article was presented at the conferences ISIT1 2014 and
ICMCTA2 2014 and published in [7, 8]. The present article provides a long version including
detailed proofs which were absent in the proceedings due to space reasons. It also includes new
results since the proceedings articles only considered the reconstruction of error correcting pairs
while we discuss here the reconstruction of error correcting arrays.
1 Prerequisites on curves and algebraic geometry codes
This section contains a brief summary of algebraic curves and algebraic geometry (AG) codes
to set up notation and terminology. For a fuller treatment we refer the reader to [44, 45].
1.1 Curves
Let X denote a smooth projective geometrically connected curve over a finite field Fq and let g
denote the genus of X . The function field of the curve X with field of constants Fq is denoted
by Fq(X ) and its elements are called rational functions. Given a place P of Fq(X ), its degree is
denoted as degP and the valuation at P of any f ∈ Fq(X )×, is denoted by vP (f). We use the
convention vp(0) =∞.
A divisor E on X is a formal sum of places E =∑P∈X nPP with nP ∈ Z. The degree of E
is the integer deg(E) :=
∑
P∈X nP deg(P ) and the support of E, is the set of places with nP 6= 0.
If all coefficients nP are nonnegative, E is an effective divisor, denoted by E > 0. Next, we
denote by E > F when E − F > 0. This defines a partial order on the group of divisors.
Let f ∈ Fq(X ) \ {0}, the divisor of f is denoted by (f). Given a divisor E on X , the
corresponding Riemann Roch space is denoted by L(E) and is defined as follows
L(E) = {f ∈ Fq(X ) | f = 0 or (f) + E > 0} .
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1.2 Weierstrass gaps
Gaps and non gaps are fundamental notions in this article. For this reason we remind several
very usual properties of these objects. See [21] for further details.
Definition 1. Let E be a divisor on X and P be a rational point. A positive integer i is called
an E-gap at P if L(E + iP ) = L(E + (i − 1)P ). Otherwise, i is an E non-gap at P . In case
E = 0, we just say gap and non-gap, respectively.
The following statement lists many elementary properties of gap and non-gap sets.
Proposition 1. (1) If i > − deg(E) + 2g then i is an E non-gap at P .
(2) The E-gaps at P lie in the interval [− deg(E),− deg(E) + 2g − 1] and the number of gaps
is exactly equal to g.
(3) If α is an F non-gap at P and β is an E non-gap at P . Then, α+β is an (F +E) non-gap
at P . In particular if α is a non-gap at P and β is an E non-gap at P . Then, α+ β is an
E non-gap at P .
(4) Let (αi)i∈N be the non-gap sequence at P and (βj)j∈N be the E non-gap sequence at P . Then,
j = dimL(E + βjP ) = dimL(E + (βj−1)P ) + 1.
Thus, j−1 6 deg(E)+βj 6 j+g−1. Moreover, deg(E)+βj = j+g−1 if deg(E)+βj > 2g−1,
i.e. j > g. Similarly i− 1 6 αi 6 i+ g − 1. Thus, αi = i+ g − 1 if i > g.
1.3 Algebraic geometry codes
We assume that the reader is aware of basic notions of coding theory and refer to [24] for further
details. Below we remind some basic notions on algebraic geometry codes and refer the reader
to [44, 45].
Given an n–tuple P = (P1, . . . , Pn) of pairwise distinct Fq–rational points of X , we denote
by DP the divisor DP := P1 + · · ·+ Pn. Let E be a divisor of X with disjoint support from P ,
then the evaluation map
evP :
{
L(E) → Fnq
f 7→ (f(P1), . . . , f(Pn))
is well–defined.
Definition 2. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be an n-tuple of mutually distinct Fq-rational points of
the curve X and let E be a divisor of X with disjoint support from DP . Then, the algebraic
geometry (AG) code CL(X ,P, E) of length n over Fq is the image of L(E) under the evaluation
map evP , that is
CL(X ,P, E) = {evP(f) | f ∈ L(E)} .
From now on, the dimension of a linear code C will be denoted by k(C) and its minimum
distance by d(C). Let X , P and E be respectively a smooth projective geometrically connected
curve over Fq, an n–tuple of Fq–rational points of X and a divisor on X . Let us remind some
well–known statements.
Theorem 2 ([44, Theorem 2.2.2]). If deg(E) < n, then
k (CL(X ,P, E)) > deg(E) + 1− g
d (CL(X ,P, E)) > n− deg(E).
Moreover, if n > deg(E) > 2g − 2, then k(CL(X ,P, E)) = deg(E)− g + 1.
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Theorem 3 ([44, Proposition 2.2.10]). There exists a differential form ω with a simple pole and
residue 1 at Pj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let K be the divisor of ω, then
CL(X ,P, E)⊥ = CL(X ,P, E⊥),
where E⊥ := DP − E +K and deg(E⊥) = n− deg(E) + 2g − 2.
2 Schur product of codes
The notion of Schur product of codes was first introduced in coding theory for decoding [33].
Next, this apparently trivial operation turned out to have many other applications such as
cryptanalysis, multiparty computation, secret sharing or construction of lattices. Many of these
applications are summarized in [38, §4].
Definition 3. The Schur product is the component wise product on Fnq : given two elements a
and b in Fnq ,
a ∗ b := (a1b1, . . . , anbn).
For two codes A,B ⊆ Fnq , their Schur product is the code A ∗B defined as
A ∗B := SpanFq {a ∗ b | a ∈ A and b ∈ B} .
For B = A, then A ∗ A is denoted as A(2) and, we define A(t) by induction for any positive
integer t.
2.1 Relation with the canonical inner product
Take notice that the Schur product should not be confused with the standard inner product
which is defined as
〈a,b〉 :=
n∑
i=1
aibi.
However, the two notions are related by the following elementary adjunction principle:
∀a,b, c ∈ Fnq , 〈a ∗ b, c〉 = 〈a,b ∗ c〉 =
n∑
i=1
aibici.
An interesting consequence of this relation between the Schur product and the canonical inner
product is the following statement which is very useful in what follows.
Lemma 4. Let A and B be two codes in Fnq . Then
{
z ∈ Fnq | z ∗ A ⊆ B
}
=
(
A ∗B⊥
)⊥
.
Proof. It is easily seen that
z ∗ A ⊆ B ⇔ 〈z ∗ a,b〉 = 0 , ∀a ∈ A and ∀b ∈ B⊥
⇔ 〈z,a ∗ b〉 = 0 , ∀a ∈ A and ∀b ∈ B⊥ ⇔ z ∈
(
A ∗B⊥
)⊥
.
5
2.2 Schur product of algebraic geometry codes
An interesting aspect of the Schur product is that the evaluation map evP introduced in Sec-
tion 1.3 arises from a morphism of algebras. More precisely, let OP be the subring of Fq(X ) of
functions regular at P1, . . . , Pn then, the map evP : OP → Fnq is a morphism of algebras since
for all f, g ∈ OP , we have ev(fg) = ev(f) ∗ ev(g). Therefore, many arithmetic properties of the
function field Fq(X ) can be understood in terms of AG codes thanks to the Schur product.
To understand the behaviour of Schur products of AG codes, we need to analyze a similar
operation in terms of the function field. That is, we need to understand the behaviour of spaces
defined by products of elements of two finite dimensional subspaces of a given function field.
Let us first introduce another notation: let A be a commutative unitary algebra over a field K.
Given two subspaces V,W of A, in the same way as for the Schur product, the product of V
and W is defined as:
V ·W := SpanK {vw | v ∈ V, w ∈W} .
We define inductively L(1) = L and L(t+1) = L(t) · L.
Theorem 5 ([31, Theorem 6]). Let E,F be two divisors on the curve X such that deg(E) > 2g+1
and deg(F ) > 2g and let t be a positive integer. Then,
(1) L(E) · L(F ) = L(E + F );
(2) L(E)(t) = L(tE).
Since the evaluation map is a morphism of algebras we deduce directly from Theorem 5 the
following statement.
Corollary 6. Let E,F be two divisors on the curve X both with disjoint support with P and
such that deg(E) > 2g + 1 and deg(F ) > 2g and let t be a positive integer. Then,
(1) CL(X ,P, E) ∗ CL(X ,P, F ) = CL(X ,P, E + F );
(2) CL(X ,P, E)(t) = CL(X ,P, tE).
We conclude this subsection with the following statement which is crucial in the sequel.
Proposition 7. Let E,F be two divisors on the curve X both with disjoint supports with P and
such that deg(F ) > 2g and deg(E) 6 n− 3. Then,
CL(X ,P, E − F ) =
(
CL(X ,P, F ) ∗ CL(X ,P, E)⊥
)⊥
=
{
z ∈ Fnq | z ∗ CL(X ,P, F ) ⊆ CL(X ,P, E)
}
.
Proof. Let A = CL(X ,P, F ) and B = CL(X ,P, E). Theorem 3 shows that B⊥ = CL(X ,P, E⊥)
with E⊥ = K − E + DP for some canonical divisor K. Next, since deg(E) 6 n − 3, we have
deg(E⊥) > 2g + 1. Now,
A ∗B⊥ = CL(X ,P,DP +K − E + F ) = CL(X ,P, E − F )⊥,
the first equality being a consequence of Corollary 6 and the last one due to Theorem 3. The
second equality of the statement follows from Lemma 4.
6
2.3 Distinguisher and cryptanalysis
Another and more recent application of the Schur product concerns cryptanalysis of code-based
public key cryptosystems. In this context, the Schur product is a very powerful operation which
can help to distinguish some algebraic codes such as AG codes from random ones. The point is
that evaluation codes do not behave like random codes with respect to the Schur product: the
square of an AG code is small compared to that of a random code of the same dimension. Thanks
to this observation, Wieschebrink [46] gave an efficient attack of Berger Loidreau’s proposal [1]
based on subcodes of GRS codes.
Recent attacks consist in using this argument and take advantage of this distinguisher in
order to compute a filtration of the public code by a family of very particular subcodes. This
filtration method yields an alternative attack on GRS codes [6]. Next it lead to a key recovery
attack on wild Goppa codes over quadratic extensions in [5, 10]. Finally in the case of AG
codes, this approach leads to an attack as we will see in Section 6. This attack consists in the
computation of an error-correcting pair (ECP) or an error-correcting array (ECA) for the public
code without retrieving the structure of the curve, the points and the divisor.
3 The s-closure operation
In this section we introduce a new operation which we call the s-closure. This operation will
be crucial in Section 4 to attack a McEliece scheme based on subcodes of AG codes. Roughly
speaking, given a random subcode C of an AG code CL(X ,P, E), if the codimension of C in
CL(X ,P, E) is small enough, then, with a high probability, the 2-closure of C provides the code
CL(X ,P, E).
Definition 4 ( s–closure). Let A be a commutative unitary algebra over a field K and suppose
that we have a subspace L of A. Let s > 2 be an integer, the s–closure of L is defined by
L
s
=
{
f ∈ A | f · L(s−1) ⊆ L(s)
}
.
The space L is called s–closed if L
s
= L.
Remark 1. Special cases are discussed in the sequel where K = Fq and either A is the field of
rational functions on the curve X and L is a subspace of a Riemann-Roch space L(E) for a
divisor E on the curve, or A = Fnq and L is a subspace of F
n
q .
3.1 General properties
We list below some properties of the s-closure operation.
Proposition 8. Let L, M and N be subspaces of A and s > 2 be an integer, then:
(1) L
s
is a vector space over K.
(2) We have the following increasing sequence: L ⊆ L2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ls ⊆ Ls+1.
(3) Let f ∈ A. Then f · Ls ⊆ (f · L)s. Equality holds if f is invertible in A.
(4) Let φ : A → K be a linear form and consider the non degenerate symmetric bilinear form
over A defined as ϕ(a, b) := φ(ab). Then
L
s
=
(
L(s−1) · L(s)⊥ϕ
)⊥ϕ
.
This holds in particular when A = Fnq and ϕ is the standard inner product.
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Proof. Statement (1) follows from the K-bilinearity of the product. To prove (2), let f ∈ Ls.
Thus,
f · L(s−1) ⊆ L(s) =⇒ f · L(s) ⊆ L(s+1).
Therefore, f ∈ Ls+1. To prove (3), let g ∈ f · Ls. Then, g = fa for some a ∈ Ls and
g · (f · L)(s−1) = f s · a · L(s−1) ⊆ f s · L(s) = (f · L)(s)
Therefore g ∈ f · Ls. If moreover f is invertible, then one can reverse the proof and the equality
holds. Finally the proof of (4) is in the very same spirit as that of Lemma 4 using the adjunction
formula ϕ(fg, h) = φ(fgh) = ϕ(f, gh), which holds for all f, g, h ∈ A.
Notice that one can have L ⊆M while Ls 6⊆M s as illustrated by the following example.
Example 1. Let A = K[x] and L := Span{1, x + x2, x3, x4} and M := L⊕ Span{x9}. A compu-
tation gives
L(2) = K[x]68 and M
(2) = K[x]68 ⊕ x9 · L⊕ Span{x18},
where K[x]68 denotes the finite dimensional subspace of K[x] of polynomials of degree less than
or equal to 8. Next, one proves easily that x ∈ L2 while x /∈ M2 since x · x9 = x10 /∈ M (2).
Therefore, L
2 6⊆M2.
On the other hand, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Let A be the field of rational functions on the curve X , let M = L(E) for a divisor
E on X and s > 2 be an integer. If L is a subspace of M , L(s) = M (s) and M s = M , then
L
s
= M .
Proof. Assume that L ⊆ L(E). Let E0 =
∑
aiPi be divisor satisfying L ⊆ L(E0) ⊆ L(E) and
minimal for this property. Then, for all i there exists a function gi ∈ L such that vPi(gi) = −ai.
Take f ∈ Ls. By definition,
f · gs−1i ∈ f · L(s−1) ⊆ L(s) ⊆ L(E0)(s) ⊆ L(sE0).
So vPi(fg
s−1
i ) = vPi(f)− (s − 1)ai > −sai. Or equivalently, vPi(f) > −ai for all i. Therefore,
(f) > −E0, that is f ∈ L(E0) ⊆ L(E) = M , and Ls ⊆M is proved.
Conversely, let f ∈M , we have f ·L(s−1) ⊆ f ·M (s−1) ⊆M (s) = L(s) and hence f ∈ Ls.
3.2 Closures of Riemann Roch spaces and AG codes
We will show that certain Riemann-Roch spaces of AG codes are s-closed. For this sake we
first need the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let E,F be two divisors on the curve X of genus g with deg(E) > 2g. Then,
E 6 F if and only if L(E) ⊆ L(F ).
Proof. The “only if” part is obvious. Conversely, let L(E) ⊆ L(F ) and suppose that E 6 F . If
E =
∑
mPP and F =
∑
nPP with eachmP , nP ∈ Z, then, sinceE 6 F , there is a place P0 such
thatmP0 > nP0 . As deg(E) > 2g, by Riemann-Roch Theorem, dim(L(E)) = deg(E)+1−g > g.
We distinguish two different cases:
• If deg(E − P0) > 2g − 2, then dim(L(E − P0)) = deg(E − P0) + 1− g < dim(L(E)).
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• If deg(E−P0) 6 2g−2, then dim(L(E−P0)) 6 12 deg(E−P0)+1, by Clifford’s Theorem.
So dim(L(E − P0)) 6 g < dim(L(E)).
In both cases, dim(L(E − P0)) < dim(L(E)). Hence, there exists a rational function f ∈
L(E) \ L(E − P0). That means that vP0(f) = −mP0 < −nP0. So f 6∈ L(F ), which contradicts
our initial assumption.
Proposition 11. Let E be a divisor on X with deg(E) > 2g+1 and s > 2 be an integer. Then,
L(E)
s
= L(E).
Proof. Inclusion L(E) ⊆ L(E)s is obvious. Conversely, let f ∈ L(E)s. By definition, f ·
L(E)(s−1) ⊆ L(E)(s). From Theorem 5 (2), this gives f · L((s − 1)E) ⊆ L(sE). A simple
computation shows that f · L((s − 1)E) = L((s − 1)E − (f)). Therefore, we have the inclusion
L((s−1)E− (f)) ⊆ L(sE) and, thanks to Lemma 10, we get (s−1)E− (f) 6 sE, which entails
(f) > −E and hence f ∈ L(E).
In terms of AG codes, this leads to:
Proposition 12. Let E be a divisor on the curve X such that 2g+1 6 deg(E) 6 n−2
t
. Let s be
an integer with s > 2. Then,
CL(X ,P, E)s = CL(X ,P, E).
Proof. Proposition 8(4) gives that
CL(X ,P, E)s =
(
CL(X ,P, E)(s−1) ∗
(
CL(X ,P, E)(s)
)⊥)⊥
. (1)
Now, from Corollary 6(2), CL(X ,P, E)(s) = CL(X ,P, sE). Moreover, by Theorem 3, we have
CL(X ,P, sE)⊥ = CL(X ,P, (sE)⊥) with (sE)⊥ = DP − sE+K for some canonical divisor K on
X . By assumption, deg(E) 6 n−2
s
and hence
deg
(
(sE)⊥
)
= n− deg(sE) + 2g − 2 > 2g.
As deg(E) > 2g + 1, then, thanks to Corollary 6(1) yields
CL(X ,P, (s − 1)E) ∗ CL(X ,P, sE)⊥ = CL(X ,P,DP − E +K) = CL(X ,P, E)⊥.
3.3 A conjecture
In [46] Wieschebrink asserts, without proving it that, with high probability, the square of a
low codimensional subcode C of a GRSk(a,b) is a GRS code. More precisely, in general,
C(2) = GRS2k−1(a,b ∗ b). Wieschebrink uses this observation to break Berger and Loidreau’s
proposal [1]. It is natural to ask whether this property extends to low codimensional subcodes
of AG codes. Some experimental results encourage us to establish the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1. Let C be a uniformly random subcode of CL(X ,P, E) of dimension ℓ such that
2g + 1 6 deg(E) 6 n−12 and 2k + 1− g 6
(
ℓ+1
2
)
where k = deg(E) + 1 − g is the dimension of CL(X ,P, E). Then, the probability that C(2) is
different from CL(X ,P, 2E) tends to 0 when k tends to infinity.
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We give a proof along the lines of [26, Remark 5] for the special case of subcodes of GRS
codes. Note that the case of GRS codes is a bit different in terms of the probabilistic model
since for a GRS code, for the length to tend to infinity, the size of the alphabet needs to tend
to infinity too. Evidences for this conjecture are discussed further below.
Corollary 13. Assume that Conjecture 1 holds. Let 2g + 1 6 deg(E) 6 n−22 . Let k :=
deg(E) + 1 − g be the dimension of CL(X ,P, E), such that 2k + 1 − g 6
(
ℓ+1
2
)
for some ℓ.
Then, the equality C
2
= CL(X ,P, E) holds for uniformly random ℓ-dimensional subcodes C of
CL(X ,P, E) with a probability tending to 1 when k tends to infinity.
Proof. Suppose Conjecture 1 holds. Let C be an l-dimensional subcode of CL(X ,P, E). By Con-
jecture 1, we would have that C(2) = CL(X ,P, E)(2) with high probability. Moreover CL(X ,P, E)
is 2-closed by Proposition 12. Thus, applying Lemma 9, we conclude that C
2
= CL(X ,P, E)
which completes the proof.
Experiments around this conjecture
To test the validity of the conjecture, we performed experiments as follows:
• Generate a random smooth irreducible plane curve over Fq using Magma command
RandomPlaneCurve;
• Choose a divisor on the curve by selecting some random rational points and places of
higher degree and sum them up;
• Compute the corresponding code C;
• Choose a random subcode C ′ of dimension ℓ such that ℓ is the least integer satisfying(
ℓ+1
2
)
> dimC(2);
• Compare C(2) and C ′(2).
Remark 2. Note that in terms of the dimension ℓ of the subcode, we tested only the critical case
i.e. the minimal value of ℓ. Clearly cases with larger ℓ’s can only be more successful.
Such a test has been performed on 100 random curves over fields Fq with 2 < q < 200. These
curve had genus 6 < g < 36. For each curve, and for any 2g+2 6 m 6 n+g−22 we chose a divisor
G of degree m and tested 10000 random subcodes. Among these 10000 tests the codes C ′(2) fails
to equal C(2) at most 0.5% of the times. Moreover, for more than 90% of pairs (curve, divisor),
the failure rate is 0%.
4 Decoding algorithms of algebraic geometry codes
4.1 Error-correcting pairs
The notion of error-correcting pair (ECP) for a linear code was introduced by Pellikaan [33,34]
and independently by Kötter [22].
Generally, given a positive integer t, a t–ECP for a linear code C ⊆ Fnq is a pair of linear
codes (A,B) in Fnq satisfying A ∗ B ⊆ C⊥ together with several inequalities relating t and the
dimensions and (dual) minimum distances of A,B,C. In a formal manner:
Definition 5. Let C be a linear code in Fnq . A pair (A,B) of linear codes over F
n
q is called a
t-error correcting pair (ECP) for C if the following conditions hold:
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(E.1) (A ∗B) ⊆ C⊥,
(E.2) k(A) > t,
(E.3) d(B⊥) > t,
(E.4) d(A) + d(C) > n.
It is shown that a linear code in Fnq with a t-error correcting pair has a decoding algorithm
which corrects up to t errors with complexity O
(
n3
)
. ECPs provide a unifying point of view for
several classical bounded distance decoding algorithms for algebraic and AG codes. See [25] for
further details.
Theorem 14 ([34, Theorem 3.3]). Let X be a curve of genus g and E be a divisor on X such
that n > deg(E) > 3g − 1. Let d∗ := deg(E) + 2 − 2g be the Goppa designed distance of
CL(X ,P, E)⊥ and t := ⌊(d∗ − 1− g)/2⌋. Let F be any divisor on X with disjoint support with
DP and deg(F ) = t+ g. Then, the pair of codes defined by
A = CL(X ,P, F ) and B = CL(X ,P, E − F )
is a t-ECP for CL(X ,P, E)⊥. Under the above conditions, such a divisor F always exists.
Corollary 15. Under the conditions stated above and assuming that deg(E) 6 n− 3 and t > 1.
Then,
A = (B ∗ C)⊥.
Proof. Notice that C = CL(X ,P, E)⊥ and
deg(E − F ) = deg(E)− deg(F ) = deg(E)− (t+ g) = deg(E)− 2t+ t− g
> deg(E)− d∗ + 1 + t = 2g + t− 1 > 2g
We now apply Proposition 7 to obtain the desired result.
Remark 3. From a cryptanalytic point of view, the above corollary asserts that, it is sufficient
to know the codes CL(X ,P, E) and CL(X ,P, E − F ) in order to get a t-ECP for CL(X ,P, E).
Roughly speaking: if you know A and C, then you know B.
4.2 Error-correcting arrays
The notion of majority voting of unknown syndromes was initiated by Feng-Rao [14] for AG
codes and by Feng-Tzeng [15] for cyclic codes. Duursma in [11, 12] treated it as majority coset
decoding.
The philosophy of these algorithms can roughly be summarized as follows. Suppose we have
a code C1 for which we need a decoding algorithm, and a subcode C2 for which we have a
decoding algorithm. Coset decoding is an algorithm which has as input a word y1 such that
y1 ∈ e+ C1, and as output y2 such that y2 ∈ e + C2. In the present article, the code C2 will
always be {0} for which there exists an obvious decoding algorithm.
These algorithms have a purely linear algebraic description using the notion of error cor-
recting arrays (ECA) [21, 23, 35] or that of well behaving sequences [16]. Take notice that error
correcting arrays deal with spaces of functions. In particular, in the case of AG codes, arrays
consist in infinite collections of Riemann Roch spaces, while well behaving sequences are defined
directly from error correcting codes without involving any other external data.
In this article we chose to adopt a slightly different point of view mixing the concepts of [35]
and [16]. For that purpose we introduce the notion of array of codes which is very similar to the
notion of error correcting array but now defined only with codes, without involving the function
fields and Riemann Roch spaces. Such array of codes is strongly related to an error correcting
array in the sense of [21, 23, 35]. Moreover, since we work only with codes, we also use the
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notion of well behaving pair which is necessary for the definition of the designed distance and
for the decoding algorithm. The choice of this mixed point of view is motivated by two facts.
First, from the cryptanalytic point of view, it is interesting to show how to design a decoding
algorithm from the single data of a generator matrix of a code. On the other hand, the operation
we perform on codes arise from natural operations on Riemann Roch spaces. For this reason,
even if we do not directly compute Riemann Roch spaces the language of arrays seemed more
convenient than that of well behaving sequences to describe and explain our calculations.
Definition 6. An array of codes is a triple (A,B, C) of sequences of linear codes A = (Ai)16i6n,
B = (Bi)16i6n and C = (Ci)16i6n satisfying the following conditions for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(A.1) dim(Ai) = i, dim(Bi) = i and dim(Ci) = n− i ;
(A.2) Ai ⊆ Ai+1, Bi ⊆ Bi+1 and Ci ⊇ Ci+1 ;
(A.3) for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a pair (i, j) such that Ai ∗Bj ⊆ C⊥r and Ai ∗Bj * C⊥r−1.
In addition we introduce the function rˆ : {1, . . . , n}2 → {1, . . . , n} defined as follows.
Definition 7. Let (A,B, C) be an error correcting array. The function rˆ is defined as
rˆ(i, j) := min
{
r ∈ {1, . . . , n}
∣∣∣ Ai ∗Bj ⊆ C⊥r
}
.
Remark 4. Condition (A.3) of arrays of codes asserts that rˆ is surjective.
Remark 5. Note that rˆ is increasing in both arguments but not necessarily strictly increasing.
In particular if for some pair (i, j) 6= (n, n) we have rˆ(i, j) = n then, it is clear that rˆ(k, l) = n
for all k > i and l > j.
Definition 8. A pair (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n}2 is said to be well behaving (WB in short) if
∀(i′, j′) such that i 6 i′, j 6 j′ and (i, j) 6= (i′, j′), rˆ(i′, j′) < rˆ(i, j).
For all r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, set
• nˆr :=
∣∣ {(i, j) | 1 6 i, j 6 n, (i, j) is WB and rˆ(i, j) = r + 1} ∣∣;
• dˆr := min {nˆr′ | r 6 r′ 6 n} .
We have the following result:
Theorem 16. For any array of codes (A,B, C) we have
dˆr 6 d(Cr), for all 1 6 r 6 n.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of [21, Theorem 2.5].
Definition 9. An array of codes (A,B, C) in Fnq is said to be t-error correcting for a code C in
Fnq if there exists an s with 1 6 s 6 n such that C = Cs and t 6
dˆs−1
2 ·
Theorem 17. A linear code C in Fnq with a t-ECA has a decoding algorithm which corrects up
to t errors with complexity O(n3).
Proof. See [14] and [21, Theorem 2.9].
Remark 6. In the literature, for instance in [35] or [21, Remark 2.10], the definition of a t–error
correcting array for a code C is more general than that of this article. Indeed, usually, an ECA
for a code C is associated to a sequence of codes (Ci)ℓ6i6u where C = Cr for some r ∈ [ℓ, u]
and the code Cℓ is either zero or has a t–ECP. This condition is sufficient to get a decoding
algorithm. Indeed, if we receive the word y = e+ c with c ∈ C and e has weight less than or
equal to t, then, by coset decoding, we obtain a vector yℓ such that yℓ = e+cℓ for some cℓ ∈ Cℓ.
Next, either Cℓ = {0} and we get directly e or Cℓ has a t–ECP which we can use to obtain e.
We chose to avoid such a general definition since it is useless for our purpose.
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The array of interest in this article
Let E be a divisor on X and P be a rational point of X . Let (αi)i∈N be the non gap sequence at
P and (βi)i∈N the E–non gap sequence at P (see Section 1.2 for further details on Weierstrass
gaps). We introduce the finite sequences (αˆi)16i6n and (βˆi)16i6n defined as follows:
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, αˆi is the least integer such that dimCL(X ,P, αˆiP ) = i;
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, βˆi is the least integer such that dim CL(X ,P, E + βˆiP ) = i.
Remark 7. For indexes i such that the evaluation map is injective, i.e. such that L(αiP−D) = 0
(resp. L(E + βiP − D) = 0), we have αˆi = αi (resp. βˆi = βi) while for larger dimensions, we
need to consider the contribution of (−D)–non-gaps at P (resp. (E −D)–non-gaps).
We define the triple (A,B, C) of sequences of linear codes in Fnq as:
• ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Ai := CL(X ,P, αˆiP );
• ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Bj := CL(X ,P, E + βˆjP );
• ∀r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Cr := CL(X ,P, E + βˆrP )⊥ = B⊥r .
Proposition 18. The above defined triple (A,B, C) is an array of codes.
Proof. Conditions (A.1) and (A.2) are direct consequences of the definition of the αˆi and βˆj ’s.
Moreover, it is easy to see that A1 is the repetition code i.e. the code spanned by (1, . . . , 1).
Hence for all 1 6 i 6 n, we have A1 ∗Bn−i = Bn−i = C⊥i which gives (A.3).
Theorem 19. Assume that deg(E) < n. Let d∗ = deg(E) + 2 − 2g be the Goppa designed
distance of CL(X ,P, E)⊥ and set t = ⌊(d∗ − 1)/2⌋. Then, the above described triple (A,B, C) is
a t–ECA for CL(X ,P, E)⊥.
Proof. Clearly, CL(X ,P, E)⊥ is an element of the sequence (Ci)16i6n. Let k be the dimension of
CL(X ,P, E)⊥. By definition, we have CL(X ,P, E)⊥ = Cn−k and βˆn−k = 0. The only thing we
need to prove is that dˆn−k > d
∗. This can be proved in a very similar fashion as [21, Corollary
3.9] which is a direct consequence of [21, Theorem 3.8]. The cited proof involves the set of pairs
(i, j) such that
αi + βj = βn−k. (2)
If we prove that for any such pair (i, j) we have αi = αˆi and βj = βˆj , then the proof of [21,
Theorem 3.8] will apply mutatis mutandis in our setting.
Let (i, j) be a pair of positive integers satisfying (2). Since we always have αi > 0, there
exists βj 6 βn−k = 0. But, the assumption deg(E) < n, entails that deg(E + βjP − D) < 0
and hence L(E − βjP −D) = {0}. Consequently, βj = βˆj . On the other hand we always have
βj > − deg(E) and hence αi 6 deg(E) < n which entails L(αiP − D) = {0} and gives that
αˆi = αi.
5 The P -filtrations
Let P be one of the points of the n-tuple P. Let E be a divisor on X that has disjoint support
from P. Let P ′ be the (n − 1)–tuple obtained from P by deleting P . In the present section we
give an efficient way to obtain a tP–ECP and a tA–ECA for the code CL(X ,P ′, E)⊥ with
d∗ = deg(E) − 2g + 2, tP =
⌊
d∗−g−1
2
⌋
and tA =
⌊
d∗−1
2
⌋
.
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By this manner, given a received word y = c+e where c ∈ CL(X ,P, E)⊥ and e has weight 6 tP
(resp. 6 tA), one can proceed to decoding as follows. Thanks to our ECP (resp. ECA), one
decodes the word y punctured at position P , which yields c punctured at this position. Then
retrieving c consists only in correcting an erasure at position P .
Remark 8. A method to deduce directly an ECP for the non punctured code is described in
Appendix A.
From the knowledge of a generator matrix of CL(X ,P, E)⊥ we aim at computing the se-
quences of codes (Ai)16i6n and (Bj)16j6n introduced in Section 4.2. For the computational
aspects it is convenient to introduce another pair of sequences very similar to (Ai)i and (Bi)i
but with different indexes. Namely, we introduce the sequences (Ui)i∈Z and (Vi)i∈Z of codes of
length n− 1 defined as
∀i ∈ Z, Ui := CL(X ,P ′, iP ) and Vi := CL(X ,P ′, E + iP ).
These sequences are related to the Ai’s and Bj ’s by the relation:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Ai = Uαˆi and Bi = Vβˆi .
The reader will observe that, despite the introduction of new notation, this other way of indexing
the sequences is more convenient for explicit computation and for understanding the behaviour
of these codes with respect to the Schur product.
5.1 Structure of the sequences (Ui)i and (Vi)i
First one observes that for all i < 0, Ui = {0}. On the other hand for all i > n + (2g) − 2 one
can prove that Ui = Fn−1q . Indeed, set
DP ′ :=
∑
P∈P ′
P.
Then, for all integer i, the evaluation map evP ′ induces an isomorphism between Ui and
L(iP )/L(iP −DP ′) and Riemann Roch theorem asserts that dimL((n+ 2g − 2)P ) = n− 1 + g
and dimL((n + 2g − 2)P − DP ′) = g which proves that dimUn+2g−2 = n− 1 and hence
Un+2g−2 = Fn−1q .
Next, one can split the sequence (Ui)06i6n+2g−2 in three parts represented by the three
following diagrams. A first part (Ui)06i62g−2 in which some consecutive terms may be equal
because of gaps at P :
{0} L(0)
∼evP′
L(P )
∼
· · · L((2g − 1)P )
6=
∼
L(2gP )
6=
∼
· · ·
{0} U0 U1 · · · U2g−1
6=
U2g
6=
· · ·
A second part (Ui)2g−16i6n−2 which is regular, i.e. any term has codimension 1 in the next one:
· · · L((2g − 1)P )
6=
∼evP′
L(2gP )
6=
∼
· · ·
6=
L((n− 2)P )
6=
∼
· · ·
· · · U2g−1
6=
U2g
6=
· · ·
6=
Un−2
6=
· · ·
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Finally, a third part (Ui)n−16i6n+2g−2 where the map evP ′ stops to be injective, but remains
surjective. In this range, consecutive terms may be equal: it happens at every (−DP ′)–non-gap:
· · · L((n− 1)P )
evP′
· · · L((n+ 2g − 3)P ) L((n+ 2g − 2)P )
· · · Un−1 · · · Un+2g−3 Fn−1q
In the very same manner, for any i < − deg(E), Vi = {0} and for any i > 2g−2+n−deg(E).
Next, the sequence splits in three parts:
• A first part (Vi) where − deg(E) + 1 6 i 6 − deg(E) + 2g − 1 in which consecutive terms
are equal at each E–gap at P ;
• a second part (Vi) where − deg(E) + 2g 6 i 6 − deg(E) + n− 2 which is regular, i.e. any
two consecutive terms are distinct;
• and a third part (Vi) where − deg(E) + n− 1 6 i 6 − deg(E) + n+ 2g − 2 in which con-
secutive terms equal at each (E −DP ′)–non–gap.
5.2 Effective computations
Here we explain how to compute the terms of this sequence only by performing Schur products
and solving linear systems. Notice that very similar methods have been used by Khuri–Makdisi
to perform effective computations on Jacobians of curves [19].
5.2.1 Which elements of the sequence do we know on the beginning?
From a generator matrix of CL(X ,P, E)⊥, one can compute CL(X ,P, E). Then, V0 and V−1 are
obtained from the code CL(X ,P, E) respectively by puncturing and shortening at the position
P . All these operation boil down to Gaussian elimination.
5.2.2 Computing terms of (Vi)i from other terms of (Vi)i
The following statement explains how to compute V−i−1 (resp. Vi+1) from the knowledge of the
codes V−i, V−i+1 (resp. Vi, Vi−1).
Proposition 20. Let i > 1, then we have
(i) if deg(E) − n−42 6 i 6 deg(E)− 2g + 1, then
V−i−1 =
{
z ∈ V−i
∣∣ z ∗ V−i+1 ⊆ V (2)−i
}
; (3)
(ii) if n−42 − deg(E) > i > 2g + 1− deg(E), then
Vi+1 =
{
z ∈ Fn−1q
∣∣ z ∗ Vi−1 ⊆ V (2)i
}
. (4)
Proof. Assume that deg(E)− n−42 6 i 6 deg(E)− 2g − 1. By Proposition 7, the solution space
of (3) is equal to
V−i ∩
(
V−i+1 ∗
(
V
(2)
−i
)⊥)⊥
.
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Since deg(E − iP ) > 2g + 1, then, from Corollary 6, we have V (2)−i = CL(X ,P ′, 2E − 2iP ).
Moreover, since deg(2E − 2iP ) 6 (n− 1)− 3, from Proposition 7 we conclude that
(
V−i+1 ∗
(
V
(2)
−i
)⊥)⊥
= CL(X ,P ′, (2E − 2iP ) − (E − (i− 1)P )) = V−i−1.
This proves (i). The proof of (ii) is very similar.
Therefore, we can define an algorithm for determining the code V−i for i > 1 wich consists
in i repeated applications of Proposition 20. But we can do better by decreasing the num-
ber of iterations and relaxing the parameters conditions using the following generalization of
Proposition 20 whose proof is very similar.
Proposition 21. Let a 6 b 6 c 6 d be integers such that a+ d = b+ c. If deg(E) + b > 2g + 1
and 2 deg(E) + b+ c 6 n− 4 then,
(i) Va =
{
z ∈ Vb
∣∣ z ∗ Vd ⊆ Vb ∗ Vc} .
(ii) If moreover deg(E) + a > 2g, then Vd =
{
z ∈ Fn−1q
∣∣ z ∗ Va ⊆ Vb ∗ Vc} ;
Remark 9. The previous statement permits for instance to compute V−i as
V−i =
{
z ∈ V⌊−i−1
2
⌋
∣∣∣ z ∗ V0 ⊆ V⌊−i−1
2
⌋ ∗ V⌊−−i+1
2
⌋
}
.
In the same spirit as the quick exponentiation algorithm, the recursive application of the above
formula allows to compute V−i in O(log(i)) iterations of Proposition 21 instead of O(i) iterations
of Proposition 20.
5.2.3 Further computations
In the same manner if we know some terms of the sequence (Ui)i we can compute other ones as
follows.
Proposition 22. Let i, j be integers.
(i) If i > 2g and j > 2g + 1 then Ui ∗ Uj = Ui+j .
(ii) Let ℓ be an integer such that i+ ℓ = 2j. If i > 2g and 2g + 1 6 j 6 n−42 , then
Uℓ =
{
z ∈ Fn−1q
∣∣ z ∗ Ui ⊆ U (2)j
}
.
It is also possible to compute some terms of one of the sequence from the knowledge of terms
of the other sequence:
Proposition 23. Let i, j, ℓ such that i+ j = ℓ, deg(E) + ℓ 6 n− 4. Then,
(i) If deg(E) + j > 2g, then Ui =
{
z ∈ Fn−1q
∣∣ z ∗ Vj ⊆ Vℓ} ;
(ii) If j > 2g, then Vi =
{
z ∈ Fn−1q
∣∣ z ∗ Uj ⊆ Vℓ} .
Finally, notice that some terms of (Vi)i can be constructed using the following statement.
Proposition 24. For all i > 2g and j > 2g − deg(E) with either i > 2g or j > 2g − deg(E),
we have Vi+j = Ui ∗ Vj.
16
5.2.4 Complexity
The computation of one of the Ui’s or Vi’s using one of the previous statement consists in
computing a finite number of Schur products. The cost of the computation of a Schur product
is O(n4) (see for instance [6, Proposition 5]). A probabilistic shortcut allows to reduce the
complexity of this computation to O(n3+ε) operation for ε > 0 arbitrarily small. Indeed, given
a code C of length n and dimension k, the computation of C(2) consists in computing the(
k+1
2
)
= O(n2) generators and then, to perform Gaussian elimination to deduce a basis from
this family of generators which costs O(n4). However, by extracting n + ε elements chosen at
random from this set of generators, we get another generating set with a large probability and
this probabilistic trick reduces the complexity to O(n3+ε). A similar probabilistic shortcut is
used in [20].
6 The Attack
6.1 The McEliece encryption scheme
Let F be a family of linear codes with an efficient decoding algorithm. Every element of this
family is represented by the triple (C,AC , t) where AC denotes a decoding algorithm for C ∈ F
which corrects up to t errors. The McEliece scheme can be summarized as follows: Alice applies
an encoding mechanism to a message and adds enough errors to make it unintelligible. Then,
Bob is the only person that knows an efficient decoding method (the secret key) to detect and
correct those errors. That is:
Key generation: Consider any element (C,AC , t) ∈ F . Let G be a generator matrix of
C. Then the public key and the private key are given respectively by
Kpub = (G, t) and Ksecret = AC .
Encryption: The plaintext m is encrypted as y = mG + e where e is a random error
vector of weight at most t.
Decryption: Using Ksecret, the receiver obtains m.
6.2 Context of the present article
In what follows, X denotes a smooth projective geometrically connected curve over Fq of genus
g, P = (P1, . . . , Pn) denotes an n-tuple of mutually distinct Fq-rational points of X , DP denotes
the divisor DP := P1 + · · ·+Pn and E denotes a divisor with disjoint support from that of DP .
We assume that our public key is a generator matrix G of the public code CL(X ,P, E)⊥ and
the largest number t of errors introduced during the encryption step. We take t 6 ⌊(d∗ − 1)/2⌋
where d∗ = deg(E) − 2g + 2 is called the designed minimum distance of the public code
CL(X ,P, E)⊥. Thus,
Cpub : G a generator matrix of CL(X ,P, E)⊥ and t.
Our attack consists in the computation either of an error-correcting pair (ECP) or of an error-
correcting array (ECA) in order to decode CL(X ,P, E)⊥. For this sake, we distinguish two
different cases:
tP 6
d∗−g−1
2 (i.e. related to ECP) and tA 6
d∗−1
2 (i.e. related to ECA).
Take notice that, from the single knowledge of a generator matrix of CL(X ,P, E), one can
compute deg(E) and the genus g of X using the following statement.
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Proposition 25 ( [27, Proposition 18]). If 2g+1 6 deg(E)<n2 . Let k1 and k2 be the dimension
of C = CL(X ,P, E) and C(2), respectively. Then,
deg(E) = k2 − k1 and g = k2 − 2k1 + 1.
6.3 In case t 6 d
∗−g−1
2
, i.e. computing an ECP
In this section we describe how to attack the McEliece cryptosystem based on AG codes when
t 6 d
∗−g−1
2 . If
n
2 − 2 > deg(E) > 3g + t− 2, then the attack summarizes as follows. The upper
bound on deg(E) can be relaxed by applying techniques from Section 6.5. On the other hand,
if deg(E) is below the lower bound 3g+t−2, one can still compute an ECA using the techniques
of Section 6.4, which provides a more efficient decoding algorithm.
Remark 10. Note that for t to be positive, the degree of E should satisfy
deg(E) > 3g.
Indeed, we have t 6 d
∗−g−1
2 =
deg(E)−3g+1
2 .
Step 1. Determine the values g and deg(E) using Proposition 25.
Step 2. Compute V0 = CL(X ,P ′, E) and V−1 = CL(X ,P ′, E − P ) by Gaussian elimination.
Step 3. Compute the code V−t−g = CL(X ,P ′, E − (t+ g)P ) using Proposition 20(i) or Re-
mark 9.
Step 4. Apply Corollary 15 to deduce an ECP for Cpub (punctured at the position P ).
Remark 11. Remind that the above procedure provides an ECP for the code CL(X ,P, E)⊥
punctured at one position. But as explained in Section 5, the decoding of CL(X ,P, E)⊥ can
be performed by first correcting errors on the punctured code and then correct an erasure on
CL(X ,P, E)⊥. A method to get directly an ECP for CL(X ,P, E)⊥ is presented in Appendix A.
Complexity The costly part of the procedure is the calculation of V−t−g. If we proceed to t+g
iterations of Proposition 20(i), then from Section 5.2.4, the complexity is O((t + g)n4). Using
Remark 9 the cost can be reduced to O(log(t + g)n4). Then, using the probabilistic shortcut
explained in Section 5.2.4 we get a complexity in O(log(t+ g)n3+ε).
Experimental results Our attack has been implemented with Magma [3], we summarize in
the following tables the average running times for several examples of codes, obtained with an
Intel r CoreTM 2 Duo 2.8 GHz. The table includes for each code its base field size q, its length
n, its dimension k, the correction capability t when using error correcting pairs and the key size
⌈(n − k)k log2 q⌉ · 10−3 kbits. The last column indicates the running time for the computation
of an ECP for the public code. Moreover, the work factor w of and ISD attack is given. These
work factors have been computed thanks to Christiane Peter’s Software [37].
Example 2. The Hermitian curve Hr over Fq with q = r2 is defined by the affine equation
Y r + Y = Xr+1. This curve has P∞ = (0 : 1 : 0) as the only point at infinity. Take E = mP∞
and let P be the n = q√q = r3 affine Fq-rational points of the curve. Table 1 considers different
codes of type CL(Hr,P, E)⊥ with n > m > 2g − 2.
Example 3. The Suzuki curves are curves X defined over Fq by the following equation Y q−Y =
Xq0(Xq −X) with q = 2q20 > 8 and q0 = 2r This curve has exactly q2 + 1 rational places and a
single place at infinity P∞. Let E = mP∞ and P be the q2 rational points of the curve. Table
2 considers a code of type CL(X ,P, E)⊥ with n > m > 2g − 2.
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q g n k t w key size time
72 21 343 193 54 284 163 kbits 74 s
92 36 729 404 126 2182 833 kbits 21 min
112 55 1331 885 168 2311 2730 kbits 67 min
Table 1: Comparison with Hermitian codes
q g n k t w key size time
25 124 1024 647 64 2110 1220 kbits 30 min
Table 2: Comparison with Suzuki codes
6.4 In case t 6 d
∗−1
2
, i.e. computing an ECA
In this section we describe how to attack the McEliece cryptosystem based on AG codes when
the integer t is smaller than d
∗−1
2 . We first suppose that 4g−1 6 deg(E) 6 n−42 . The lower
degree case will be treated further. Then, one can compute the sequences (Ui)i and (Vi)i as
follows.
Step 0 As explained in Section 5.2.1, compute V0 and V−1.
Step 1 By applying iteratively Proposition 20(i) on can compute V−2, . . . , V−2g−1 from the
knowledge of V0, V−1. These computations are possible under the above conditions on
deg(E).
Step 2 Compute U0, . . . , U2g+1 using Proposition 23(i).
Step 3 Compute U2g+2, . . . , U4g+2 using Proposition 22(ii), then compute the rest of the se-
quence (Ui)i using Proposition 22(i).
Step 4 Compute the Vi’s for i > 0 using Proposition 24.
Step 5 Compute the remaining Vi’s (for i < −2g − 1) using either Proposition 23(ii) or Propo-
sition 21(i).
Assume now that 2g + 1 6 deg(E) 6 4g + 1, one can proceed as follows. First, using
Corollary 6 , one can compute CL(X ,P ′, 2E) as CL(X ,P ′, E)(2). Next, since deg(2E) > 4g+1,
using the above described process, one can compute the whole filtrations
Ui = CL(X ,P ′, iP ) and V ′i = CL(X ,P ′, 2E + iP ).
If E > 0, then, one can compute any Vi = CL(X ,P ′, E + iP ) such that 2 deg(E) + i < n as
CL(X ,P ′, E + iP ) = CL(X ,P ′, E) ∩ CL(X ,P ′, 2E + iP ).
If E 6> 0, one can compute the Vi’s for i > 2g using Proposition 24. Next, the Vi’s for the other
values of i can be computed using iteratively Proposition 23(ii).
Remark 12. Note that the case deg(E) 6 2g is irrelevant. Indeed, since the Goppa designed
distance is deg(E) + 2 − 2g, considering codes with deg(E) 6 2g would mean that the Goppa
designed distance is 6 2 and hence no error can be corrected.
Complexity Since we have O(n) codes to compute using methods described in Section 5.2.1,
according to Section 5.2.4, the complexity of the construction of the sequences is O(n5) if we
use a deterministic algorithm and O(n4+ε) if we use the probabilistic shortcut.
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6.5 Extending the attack
We have been working under the assumption that deg(E) 6 n2 − 2. In the remainder of this
section we will see how this condition can be weakened.
6.5.1 By dualizing
A first manner to address the case deg(E) > n2 − 2 is to consider the dual code. Since, from
Theorem 3, CL(X ,P ′, E)⊥ = CL(X ,P ′, E⊥) with deg(E⊥) = n−deg(E)+2g− 2. Next suppose
that deg(E⊥) 6 n2 − 2, then, using the previous results one can compute the whole filtrations
Ui = CL(X ,P ′, iP ) and Wi = CL(X,P ′, E⊥ + iP )
and there remains to notice that
W⊥i = CL(X ,P ′, E − iP ) = V−i,
which permits to compute the filtration (Vi)i.
In summary, this dualization approach permits to treat the case deg(E) > n2 + 2g. There
remains to treat the case where
n
2
− 2 < deg(E) < n
2
+ 2g.
This issue is partially addressed in the next section.
6.5.2 By shortening
Up to now, we explained how to break the system unless:
n
2
− 2 < deg(E) < n
2
+ 2g.
Note that, according to the previous section, one can either work on the code or its dual.
Therefore, there remains to treat the case
n
2
− 2 < deg(E) < n
2
+ g.
Notation 1. Consider the code C = CL(X ,P, E). Let I be a subset of {1, . . . , n} and PI the
divisor
∑
j∈I Pj . The code CL(X ,P, E − PI) is denoted by C(I).
If we delete the zero positions of the code C(I) we obtain a code of length n − |I| which is
nothing but the shortening of C at I. The interest of shortening is that
|I| > 2 deg(E)− n+ 4 =⇒ deg(E − PI) < n− |I|
2
· (5)
Hence, if deg(E) > n2 − 2, then for a set of indexes I such that |I| is large enough, the
shortened code at I satisfies the degree constraint.
This can be applied for cryptanalysis as follows. For instance, suppose we know Vi−1 and Vi
and aim to compute Vi+1 using Proposition 20(ii) but unfortunately deg(E)+iP >
n
2 − 2. Then,
choose some sets of indexes I1, . . . , Is satisfying (5) and compute the codes Vi(I1), . . . , Vi(Is),
and Vi−1(I1), . . . , Vi−1(Is) by Gaussian elimination. Afterwards, using Proposition 20(ii), deduce
from them the codes Vi+1(I1), . . . , Vi+1(Is) and sum them up. The following statement asserts
that this sum of codes equals Vi+1 provided some mild conditions on the Ij’s are satisfied.
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Lemma 26. Let F be a divisor of degree less than n. Let I1, . . . , Is be subsets of {1, . . . , n} such
that deg(F )− |⋃sj=1 Ij| > 2g − 2. Then,
C(I1 ∩ · · · ∩ Is) = C(I1) + · · ·+ C(Is).
In particular, if I1 ∩ · · · ∩ Is = ∅, then C = C(I1) + · · · + C(Is).
Proof. Since deg(F ) < n, the evaluation map is injective on L(F ). Hence it is sufficient to prove
that
L(F − PI1∩···∩Is) = L(F − PI1) + · · ·+ L(F − PIs).
We give the proof for the case s = 2. The general case deduces from that one using a descending
induction on s. First, since F − PI1 6 F − PI1∩I2 and F − PI2 6 F − PI1∩I2 we get
L(F − PI1) + L(F − PI1) ⊆ L(F − PI1∩I2).
Conversely, we will prove that both sides have the same dimension. For this sake one first
observes that
L(F − PI1) ∩ L(F − PI2) = L(F − PI1∪I2),
which entails that
dim(L(F − PI1) + L(F − PI2)) =
dim(L(F − PI1)) + dim(L(F − PI2))− dim(L(F − PI1∪I2)).
By assumption on |I1 ∪ I2|, all the degrees of the above involved divisors exceed 2g − 2 and
hence, from Riemann Roch theorem,
dim (L(F − PI1) + L(F − PI2)) = deg(F )− g + 1− (|I1|+ |I2| − |I1 ∪ I2|) ,
which is nothing but dimL(F − PI1∩I2). This concludes the proof.
If we go back to the situation
n
2
− 2 < deg(E) < n
2
+ g.
We have deg(E) = n2 − 2 + ε for some 1 6 ε 6 g − 1. Therefore, we need to shorten the
code at least at 2ε positions. Moreover, for the attack to work on the shortened code, we need
deg(E)− 2ε > 2g. In the worst case, ε = g − 1 and the attack on the shortened code is proved
to be efficient only if deg(E) > 4g − 2.
6.5.3 Are there codes out of the reach of the attack?
For the codes such that
n
2
− 2 < deg(E) < n
2
+ g
and such that deg(E) 6 4g − 2, the previously described attack is not proved to be efficient.
Such codes can be obtained from Garcia Stichtenoth towers by taking a curve with a large genus
g and whose number of points is ≈ c · g for some positive constant c. In this context, one can
construct a code of length n = c′ · g for some positive constant c′ < c and consider a divisor E
of degree n2 + g. If c
′ < 6 any of the previously described method cannot be proved to work.
However, for such codes, we can still try to apply the algorithms even if we have no proof
they will provide the expected result. For a divisor A of degree < 2g+1, the code CL(X ,P, A)(2)
may be non equal to the code CL(X ,P, 2A) but is at least a subcode of it. This subcode can
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be used to try to compute subcodes of the form CL(X ,P ′, A− iP ). Moreover, the previous
approach using shortening leaves us many lattitude, since there is a large family of subsets we
can use. Thus, by trying many tuples of subsets (I1, . . . , Is) we will probably be able to collect
vectors of a target space Ui or Vi and after sufficiently many trials, get the whole target space.
In addition that if this approach turned out to fail on both CL(X ,P ′, E) and CL(X ,P ′, E⊥), it
is always possible to choose another point P in the support P and re-try with another P ′.
Despite the lack of proofs in this situation, the existence of a code for which, the attack
would fail for both CL(X ,P ′, E) and CL(X ,P ′, E⊥), for any choice of shortening and for any
choice of point P ∈ P seems highly improbable.
7 Subcodes of AG codes
In this section we give a polynomial time attack on the McEliece public key cryptosystem based
on subcodes of AG codes. Now, our public key is a non structured generator matrix G of a
subcode C of CL(X ,P, E)⊥ of dimension ℓ, together with the error correcting capacity t. Our
attack consists in recovering the code CL(X ,P, E)⊥ from the knowledge of C and then use
one of the attacks presented in Section 6. That is, once CL(X ,P, E)⊥ is recovered, we design
an efficient decoding algorithm for CL(X ,P, E)⊥ which corrects up to t errors. This yields a
decoding algorithm for our public code C.
The genus zero case (i.e. the case of GRS codes) proposed in [1] was broken by Wieschebrink
[46] as follows:
• the public key C is contained in some secret GRSk(a,b);
• compute C(2) which is, with a high probability, equal to GRSk(a,b)(2), which is itself equal
to GRS2k−1(a,b ∗ b).
• Apply Sidelnikov Shestakov attack [42] to recover a and b ∗ b, then recover b.
Compared to Wieschebrink’s approach, our difficulty is that our attack is not a key-recovery
attack but a blind construction of a decoding algorithm. For this reason, even if C(2) provides
probably the code CL(X ,P, E)(2) , it is insufficient for our purpose: we need to find CL(X ,P, E).
This is the reason why we introduced the notion of s–closures in Section 3.
7.1 Principle of the attack
In this section the public key consists in an ℓ-dimensional subcode C of the AG code CL(X ,P, E)⊥.
Let k := dimCL(X ,P, E). We assume that
2g + 1 6 deg(E) 6 n−12 and 2k − 1 + g 6
(
l+1
2
)
.
Moreover, assume Conjecture 1 to be true. Then, with a high probability, we may assume that
C(2) = CL(X ,P, 2E) and hence C2 = CL(X ,P, E) by Corollary 13. Therefore, to break the
scheme we can proceed as follows.
Step 1. Compute C
2
by applying Proposition 7, which boils down to Gaussian elimination.
Step 2. Apply the polynomial time attack presented in Section 6 to obtain an ECP or an
ECA for CL(X ,P, E)⊥. Which yields a decoding algorithm for C.
Remark 13. In case deg(E) > n−12 , then the attack can be applied to several shortenings of
C whose 2–closures are computed separately and are then summed up to provide CL(X ,P, E).
This method is described in Section 6.5.
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Complexity: The computation of a closure costs O(n4) operations in Fq. It can be reduced
to O(n3+ε) operations using the probabilistic shortcut presented in Section 5.2.4. According to
the previous results, the rest of the attack is at most in O(n5).
Experimental results This attack has been implemented with MAGMA. To this end L
random subcodes of dimension ℓ from Hermitian codes of parameters [n, k]q were created. It
turned out that for all created subcodes a t-ECP could be reconstructed. Time represents the
average time of the computation of an Error correcting pair for the public code obtained with
an Intel r CoreTM 2 Duo 2.8 GHz. The work factor w of an ISD attack is given. These work
factors have been computed thanks to Christiane Peter’s Software [37].
q n k t Time key size w l L
72 343 193 54 80 s
83 kbits 230 50 1000
137 kbits 243 100 1000
163 kbits 262 150 1000
q n k t Time key size w l L
92 729 521 19 30 min
216 ko 232 50 500
670 ko 2121 200 500
835 ko 2178 400 500
Table 3: Running times of the attack over Hermitian codes
7.2 Which codes are subject to this attack?
The subcode C ⊆ CL(X ,P, E) should satisfy:
(i)
(
dimC+1
2
)
> dimCL(X ,P, 2E);
(ii) 2g + 1 6 deg(E) 6 n−22 ;
The left-hand inequality of (ii) is in general satisfied. On the other hand, as explained above,
the right-hand inequality of (ii) can be relaxed by using a shortening trick. Constraint (i) is
more central since a subcode which does not satisfies it will probably behave like a random code
and it can be checked that a random code is in general 2–closed. Thus, computing the 2–closure
of such a subcode will not provide any significant result. On the other hand, for an AG code of
dimension k, subcodes which do not satisfy (i) have dimension smaller than
√
2k and choosing
such very small subcodes and decode them as subcodes of CL(X ,P, E) would represent a big
loss of efficiency. In addition, if these codes have a too low dimension they can be subject to
generic attacks like information set decoding.
7.3 Subfield subcodes still resist
Assume Fq to be non prime and let F be a proper subfield of Fq and C := CL(X ,P, E) ∩ Fn.
The point is that C(2) ⊆ CL(X ,P, E)(2) ∩ Fn and the 2-closure of C in general differs from
CL(X ,P, E). For this reason, subfield subcodes resist to this kind of attacks. Notice that even
in genus zero: subfield subcodes of GRS codes still resist to filtration attacks unless for the
cases presented in [5,10]. Moreover, similarly to the case of classical Goppa codes, some of these
codes are known to have a good designed distance, see for instance [18,43,47] or [4] for another
construction based on the Cartier operator. Therefore, these codes provide a good candidate for
a secure generalisation of the original McEliece scheme based on classical Goppa codes.
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Conclusion
We gave polynomial time algorithms which permit one to reconstruct either an error correcting
pair or an error correcting array of a given code. After the works of Faure and Minder [13] who
broke McEliece scheme based on codes from hyperelliptic curves of low genus, the present article
gives a general attack proving that McEliece scheme based on AG codes from any curve of any
genus is totally insecure. Moreover, we show that the countermeasure consisting in replacing an
AG code by a random low codimensional subcode is insecure too since the parent code can be
recovered by a computation of a 2–closure.
On the other hand, similarly to the genus 0 case, subfield subcodes of AG codes are completely
out of the reach of our attack and remain an interesting candidate for a generalisation of the
original McEliece scheme based on classical Goppa codes.
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A From degenerate to non-degenerate
In Section § 6.3, we explain how to compute a subcode CL(X ,P, E − F ) of CL(X ,P, E), however
this code is degenerated since F = (t+g)P and hence the position corresponding to P is zero for
any codeword of CL(X ,P, E − F ). This is the reason why we cannot directly perform decoding
on CL(X ,P, E)⊥ and should first decode its puncturing at P .
In what follows, we explain how to compute another code CL(X ,P, E − F ′), where F ′ is
linearly equivalent to F , i.e. F ′ = F + (h) for some rational and has disjoint support with
DP . It should be pointed out that we do not need to compute h but just prove its existence. In
addition to the previous calculations, the computation of a generator matrix of CL(X ,P, E − F ′)
requires the knowledge of the code V−(t+g+1) which can be obtained thanks to Proposition 20(i).
Proposition 27. Let G be a generator matrix of V−(t+g) of the form
G =
(
0 c1
(0) G1
)
,
where c1 ∈ Fn−1q and
(
0 c1
) ∈ V−(t+g) \ V−(t+g+1) and ( (0) G1 ) is a generator matrix of
V−(t+g+1). Then, there exists a rational function h on X such that the matrix
G′ :=
(
1 c1
(0) G1
)
is a generator matrix for CL(X ,P, E − (t+ g)P − (h)).
Proof. For simplicity suppose that P = P1, i.e. P corresponds to the first column of the
generator matrix. Let f ∈ L(E − (t + g)P ) \ L(E − (t + g + 1)P ) be the function such that
(0 | c1) = (f(P1), . . . , f(Pn)). By definition, vP (f) = t + g. From the weak approximation
Theorem [44, Theorem 1.3.1], there exists a rational function h ∈ Fq(X ) such that
(i) ∀i > 2, h(Pi) = 1;
(ii) vP1(h) = −t− g and hf(P1) = 1.
Such a function h yields the result.
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